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Owner/Lender Liability to Unpaid Subcontractors
When subcontractors remain unpaid for labor or materials fur-
nished at a construction site, where can they look for restitution?
Since their contract is with the general or prime contractor, the
most obvious answers include seeking recovery from the general
contractor,' proceeding under their right to file a mechanic's lien,2
or seeking recovery as third party beneficiaries under a payment
bond.3 However, the subcontractors may not be able to pursue
their claims against a general contractor if the general contractor is
destitute. Furthermore, lien rights may have been waived and a
payment bond may not exist. Under these circumstances, may a
subcontractor recover from the owner of the job site or the lender
that is furnishing the funds to pay for the construction?
A subcontractor is limited in claiming restitution from an owner
or lender because they are not in privity with any contracts to
which the lender or owner is a party. However, Pennsylvania
courts have developed a number of theories which may permit a
subcontractor to recover payment from a lender or owner despite
this lack of privity. Subcontractors have attempted to base owner
or lender liability on theories of unjust enrichment, constructive
trust, third party beneficiary, equitable obligations, reliance,
agency, and tortious interference with contractual relations. This
comment will examine the current state of law of owner/lender lia-
1. Most construction projects involve the successful interaction between the owner of
the property, the lender supplying the funds, the general contractor, and subcontractors.
The lender contracts with the owner to provide funds for the construction project. The
owner will in turn contract with the general contractor to have the work done. The general
contractor will then contract with subcontractors to complete specific phases of the project,
i.e., plumbing, electrical wiring, and carpentry. The lender or owner has little, if any, contact
with the subcontractors. If a subcontractor is not paid, their remedy is to bring an action
against the general contractor for breach of contract.
2. See 49 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1301 et seq ( Purdon 1965 & Supp 1990).
3. The owner or lender may require the general contractor to post a performance bond
for the protection of subcontractors supplying labor and material to the general contractor.
If the general contractor then fails to pay subcontractors, the subcontractors can recover as
third party beneficiaries from the surety. For example, when public works or improvements
are involved, bonds are required to protect subcontractors. See 8 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 193
(Purdon Supp 1990). See also, 53 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 46406 (Purdon 1966 & Supp
1990)(bonds required for the protection of labor and materialmen when any person, copart-
nership, association, or corporation enters into a contract with boroughs).
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bility to unpaid subcontractors with respect to the application and
effectiveness of these theories.
II. RECOVERY BASED ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A subcontractor may assert that an owner/lender has been un-
justly enriched when it would be inequitable for the owner or
lender to retain the benefit of the subcontractor's labor and mater-
ials without providing payment to the subcontractor.
To assert recovery based on an unjust enrichment theory, the
subcontractor must be able to prove at least two things. First, the
subcontractor must prove that there has been a benefit bestowed
upon the owner/lender.' Second, the retention of the benefit must
be "unjust."'5 The question as to whether the owner/lender has
been "unjustly enriched" by the efforts of a- subcontractor will de-
pend on the individual circumstances of each case." If the owner or
lender has been unjustly enriched, the amount of recovery allowed
will be based on the value of the benefit conferred and not on the
amount of the subcontractor's loss.
7
As the cases in this section illustrate, the theory of unjust en-
richment has been advanced when the owner or lender who is
funding the project has stopped payment on the project and with-
held project funds, while the subcontractors remain unpaid for la-
bor and material. However, the fact that funds were withheld will
not alone support a claim of unjust enrichment where the owner or
lender has not retained the benefit of the subcontractor's work. For
example, in R.M. Shoemaker Co. v Southeastern Pennsylvania
Development Corp.,8 there was no "enrichment" to a lender that
had not come into possession of, or acquired title to, the property,
nor had profited from the transaction when it withheld advances to
a contractor.9 Furthermore, even if the one who withholding the
project funds has been enriched by receiving the benefit of the
4. See for example, Meehan v Cheltenham Township, 410 Pa 446, 189 A2d 593 (1963).
5. Meehan, 189 A2d at 595.
6. Gee v Eberle, 279 Pa Super 101, n.7, 420 A2d 1050, n.7 (1980).
7. Meehan, 189 A2d at 595. In Meehan a developer became insolvent prior to paying
the subcontractor for material and labor expended in installing streets and sewers. The
streets and sewers were subsequently dedicated to the township and the subcontractor sued
the township on a theory of unjust enrichment, seeking restitution for the value of his mate-
rial and labor. The court denied recovery, noting that the subcontractor "cannot merely
allege its own loss as the measure of recovery - i.e., the value of labor and material expended
- but instead must demonstrate that the [owner/lender] has in fact benefitted." Id at 595.
8. 275 Pa Super 504, 419 A2d 60 (1980).
9. Shoemaker, 419 A2d at 63.
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subcontractor's work, the enrichment is not "unjust" if, prior to
the stopping of payments, advancements had been made to cover
the cost of the subcontractor's work.1" Consequently, the enrich-
ment is not unjust if it would require the enriched owner to pay for
the subcontractor's labor or materials twice. 1 However, when a
lender or owner retains funds while enjoying the benefits of the
subcontractor's labor, restitution based on unjust enrichment may
be maintained as the following two cases illustrate.
In Gee v Eberle,2 when the owner defaulted on its payments
during construction of a shopping plaza, the lender foreclosed on
the property, completed the project, and purchased the property at
a sheriff's sale. 13 At the time of the owner's default, a number of
the subcontractors remained unpaid for work done.14 The property
was later sold at a profit.' 5 The subcontractors argued that the
owner/lender was enriched because the owner/lender had sold the
property at a profit, and that the enrichment was unjust because
10. See Myers-Macomber Engineers v M.L. W. Construction Corp. and HNC Mort-
gage and Realty Investors, 271 Pa Super 484, 414 A2d 357 (1979). In Myers-Macomber the
developer/owner defaulted on a mortgage commitment before the lender had advanced the
total mortgage commitment of $5,850,00. Myers-Macomber, 414 A2d at 359. The lender
took possession and subsequently purchased the property at a sheriff's sale. Id. One of the
unpaid subcontractors sought to recover its costs from the lender for site preparation. Id.
The court noted that, prior to the developers default, the lender had advanced the money
budgeted for site preparation. Id. at 360. Any benefit the lender/owner had received from the
subcontractor's work was not unjust since the lender had already paid for the work. Id. The
court further noted that it did not appear that the lender/owner was able to sell the prop-
erty at a profit. Id at 360-61. The court did not say if the outcome of the case would have
been different if the lender had been able to sell the property at a profit. This issue was
resolved in Gee v Eberle, 279 Pa Super 101, 420 A2d 195 (1980), which held that, even if the
property was sold at a profit, the lender was not unjustly enriched if the funds had previ-
ously been advanced to cover the work. See notes 12 - 21 and accompanying text.
11. See Meyers Plumbing & Heating v West End Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n.,
345 Pa Super 559, 498 A2d 966 (1985). In Meyers Plumbing & Heating the subcontractors
were suing the owner for materials ordered by, and sold to, the general contractor but not
paid for. Meyers Plumbing & Heating, 498 A2d at 967. The court affirmed the lower court's
summary judgment in favor of the owner, holding that the owner was not unjustly enriched
when the funds to pay the subcontractors had already been advanced by the lender and
would be included in the mortgage loan owed by the owners to the lender. Id at 969. Thus,
to require the owners to pay the subcontractors would ". . .require [the owners] to pay for
the same items twice. As a result of the money having already been paid once, it can hardly
be said that the owners' "enrichment" from the plumbing and heating materials is unjust."
Id. The subcontractors in Meyers Plumbing & Heating also argued for recovery based on a
third party beneficiary theory (see notes 84 - 86 and accompanying text), and an agency
theory (see notes 103 - 110 and accompanying text).
12. 279 Pa Super 101, 420 A2d 195 (1980).
13. Gee, 420 A2d at 1053.
14. Id at 1054.
15. Id at 1062.
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the owner/lender had retained funds for the project.16 The subcon-
tractors futher argued that their unsatisfied claims against the
owner should be satisfied from the unexpended loan funds of the
project.17 The court determined it would decide de novo the issue
as to whether, under Pennsylvania law, an unpaid subcontractor
could recover against a lender on the theory of unjust enrich-
ment.18 The court held that the subcontractors could assert a the-
ory of recovery based on unjust enrichment. Moreover, the court
refused to impose any additional requirements on subcontractors,
e.g., a showing (1) that the subcontractor had exhausted statutory
or contractual remedies, or (2) that the owner/lender had engaged
in some wrongdoing or misrepresentations, or (3) some direct con-
tractual relationship existed between the subcontractor and lender
or owner.' In responding to the subcontractors' argument that
they were entitled to recovery because the owner/lender had sold
the property at a profit, the court stated:
If the lender has in fact made advances to pay for the work of a subcontrac-
tor, it has satisfied its obligation - so far as it is concerned, it has paid for
the work - and the subcontractor may not claim part of the proceeds of the
profit on an unjust enrichment theory. If, however, the lender has not made
advances to pay for the work of the subcontractor, the subcontractor may
be entitled to recover from the lender on a claim of unjust enrichment. On
that claim, evidence of the resale may be relevant as tending to show the
value to the lender of the subcontractor's work.
20
16. See generally, Gee v Eberle, 279 Pa Super 101, 420 A2d 1050 (1980).
17. Gee, 420 A2d at 1050. The original loan agreement was for $1,350,000. The lender
withheld funds after a total of $1,016,508.49 had been advanced. The subcontractors wanted
the difference between these figures. Id at 1055.
18. The Gee court based its decision on the uncertainty as to the scope of Myers-
Macomber, see note 10, stating "Myers-Macomber may be read as implicitly holding that
such recovery will be allowed, denying it not as a matter of legal principle but rather be-
cause on the facts there was no unjust enrichment. However, Myers-Macomber may be read
more narrowly, as going no further than assuming arguendo, without holding, that recovery
will be allowed on proof of unjust enrichment, thus leaving undecided the issue of legal
principle." Id at 1057.
19. Id at 1058-59. The court recognized that this was the minority view, but rejected
the imposition of these requirements, stating, "It is not apparent to us ... why a subcon-
tractor should have to satisfy any of these additional requirements to make out a case for
unjust enrichment." Id at 1059. The court further stated that its decision was ". . . sound
and consistent with our decisions on the nature of a claim of unjust enrichment." Id at 1060.
However, the recent supreme court decision in D.A. Hill Co. v Clevetrust Realty Investors,
524 Pa 425, 573 A2d 1005 (1990), has revised the holding of Gee by deciding that if the one
enriched had requested the benefit or misled anyone, the enrichment is not "unjust." See
notes 32 - 40 and accompanying text.
20. Gee, 420 A2d at 1062. The court's statement makes it clear that if funds have been
advanced to pay the subcontractors, the owner has not been unjustly enriched just because a
subcontractor has not been paid and the property is later sold at a profit. In this case the
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Since it was unclear in Gee whether the lender had made ad-
vances to the subcontractors before withholding payments, the
case was remanded for determination of this issue.21
One year after the Gee v Eberle decision, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in In re Gebco Investment Corp.2 held that sub-
contractors could recover from a trustee in bankruptcy, who stood
in the shoes of the owner, under a theory of unjust enrichment.2 3
The facts in In re Gebco Investment Corp. were similar to those in
Gee v Eberle. The owner had defaulted on its mortgage obligation
after the lender had advanced only part of the total loan obliga-
tion.2 The lender, invoking the terms of the loan agreement, re-
fused to advance further funds and withheld the remaining project
funds.2 5 However, some of the subcontractors continued to work
after the lender had withheld payments.2 6 Subsequently, the owner
filed a Chapter X petition for reorganization and, pursuant to a
bankruptcy court order, the trustee sold the property.27 Thereafter,
the lender received the full price of the mortgage and disclaimed
any interest in the funds that had been withheld.28 The issue in-
volved who was entitled to the money, the subcontractors or the
trustee who stood in the shoes of the owner?
The court noted that both the lender and the owner were en-
riched because of the sale of the property.2 9 Furthermore, because
no funds had been advanced by the lender or owner to the subcon-
tractors the enrichment was unjust.30 Thus, the subcontractors
were able to recover on their theory of unjust enrichment."1
owner may be enriched, but not unjustly, since he has paid for the work.
21. Id at 1061. The subcontractors also sought recovery based on a constructive trust
theory (see notes 50 - 52 and accompanying text), third party beneficiary theory (see note 90
and accompanying text), and reliance theory (see notes 98 - 102 and accompanying text).
22. 641 F2d 143 (3d Cir 1981).
23. Gebco, 641 F2d at 149.





29. The lender was enriched because it had received funds for the entire mortgage,
even though $25,420 of the mortgage funds was undisbursed. The owner (trustee) was en-
riched because the building had cost approximately $86,000, but sold for $120.000. Id at
148-49.
30. The court noted that "[i]f that profit is increased by [the owners] failure to pay
subcontractors who improved the property. .. [the] benefit would constitute unjust enrich-
ment." Id at 149.
31. Id. The court also held that the subcontractor could recover on a third party bene-
ficiary theory (see notes 67 to 73 and accompanying text), or equitable assignment theory
1991
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Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in D.A. Hill Co. v
Clevetrust Realty Investors,3 2 has imposed additional require-
ments on subcontractors seeking restitution based on unjust en-
richment. Noting that even if an owner/lender was enriched, the
court held that the enrichment would not be unjust if the owner/
lender had not requested the benefit or mislead one of the par-
ties.33 In D.A. Hill Co. the owner had defaulted after the lender
had partially paid the amount agreed upon in the loan agree-
ment." The lender foreclosed on the property, a mall, and later
purchased it at a sheriff's sale. 5 Relying on the decision in Gee v
Eberle, the unpaid subcontractors filed a complaint alleging that
the lender had been unjustly enriched.3 6 The trial court found that
funds had been withheld from some of the subcontractors and that
the owner/lender had been unjustly enriched. 7 The superior court
affirmed.3 8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on two
grounds, one being that the owner/lender was not enriched because
the subcontractors failed to establish that the owner/lender had
benefitted from their work.3 9 However, the court supplemented
this holding by stating:
Further, even if the value of the benefit had been established, the subcon-
tractors could not recover on an unjust enrichment theory because, assum-
ing that [the lender] was enriched, it was not unjustly enriched .... [A]
third party is not unjustly enriched when it receives a benefit from a con-
tract between two other parties where the party benefitted has not re-
quested the benefit or misled the other parties. There is no evidence of rec-
ord that [the lender] either requested anything from the subcontractors or
misled anyone; in fact, it did nothing more than exercise its rights under the
construction loan agreement to discontinue construction installment pay-
ments and foreclose on the property. The subcontractors in this case volun-
tarily waived their rights to mechanics' liens and went forward without be-
ing protected by a performance bond. These decisions were a [calculated
business risk]. It would be manifestly unfair for this Court to restructure
these contractual arrangements in such a way as to place all of the risk on
(see notes 91 to 93 and accompanying text).
32. 524 Pa 425, 573 A2d 1005 (1990).
33. D.A. Hill, 573 A2d at 1010.




38,' Id at 1008.
39. Id at 1010 (the court determined that the lender was not enriched, because the
lender had advanced more money than the property was valued at - the lender had ad-
vanced approximately $ 1,903,000 but the court found the property to be worth an esti-
mated $1,900,0000).
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[the lender], thus insulating the subcontractors from any responsibility for
their own decisions and making [the lender] in effect the insurer of the sub-
contractors interest.
40
D.A. Hill Co. can be viewed as partially overruling Gee v Eb-
erle4 1 in that two of the three additional requirements, which had
specifically been rejected in Gee v Eberle,"2 are now fundamental
in determining whether a subcontractor has a claim against the
owner/lender based on an unjust enrichment theory. While there is
still no requirement that there be a direct contractual relationship
between the owner/lender and the subcontractor," the subcontrac-
tor now must show that the owner/lender has requested the benefit
or has misled someone. Furthermore, the D.A. Hill court has at
least suggested that where the subcontractor has waived its statu-
tory right to file a lien, or has failed to get a performance bond,
restitution based on an unjust enrichment theory will be denied."
(In light of this decision, subcontractors should be aware of these
additional requirements if they attempt to recover for unpaid work
and materials based on a theory of unjust enrichment)."'
40. Id at 1010 (footnote omitted).
41. Gee, 420 A2d at 1050. See notes 12 to 21 and accompanying text.
42. Gee, 420 A2d at 1060. See note 19 and accompanying text.
43. In fact, in Pennsylvania the law remains that "[t]he doctrine of unjust enrichment
is clearly 'inapplicable when the relationship between the parties is founded on a written
agreement or express contract.'" Gee v Eberle, 279 Pa Super 119, 420 A2d 1060 (1980)
(quoting Roman Mosaic and Tile Co., Inc. v Vollrath, 226 Pa Stper 215, 218, 313 A2d 305,
307 (1973).
44. The court in D.A. Hill seemed especially concerned about restructuring contrac-
tual arrangements as to place all the risk on the lender. D.A. Hill, 573 A2d at 1010 ("If the
right to file a mechanics' lien has been waved ... a court should not rewrite the contract of
the parties or legislate a right to receive payment from a mortgagee who has been compelled
to go into possession to preserve its security."). Id at n. 5 (citing Myers-Macomber Engi-
neers v M.L.W. Construction Corp., 271 Pa Super,484, 49i, 414 A2d 357, 361 (1979)). How-
ever, no mention was made of the purpose of Pennsylvania's lien statute. See 49 Pa Cons
Stat Ann § 1101 et seq (1965 & Supp 1990). At least one court has held that when the
statute does not expressly state that its remedy is exclusive, and when the liberal purpose of
the statute is to benefit subcontractors, it would be "illogical" to find that the legislature
sought to expand the subcontractors' remedies by providing the vehicle of a mechanics' lien,
while at the same time foreclosing a remedy based on a theory of unjust enrichment. Guar-
antee Elec. Co. v Big Rivers Electric Corp., 669 F Supp 1371 (W D Ky 1987).
45. One can imagine a situation where, due to the unequal bargaining positions be-
tween a subcontractor and the general contractor, the subcontractor has agreed to waive its
statutory right to a mechanics' lien on the property and has failed to secure a performance
bond from the contractor. It would seem that a strict application of the court's holding in
D.A. Hill Co. would deny the subcontractor any recover based on an unjust enrichment
theory, even if the owner/lender had retained funds from which the subcontractor expected
payment. The reason for this assumption is because, although the owner/lender may have
been enriched, the enrichment would not be "unjust" simply because the subcontractor had
not secured a performance bond and had waived its right to file a lien on the property.
The Pennsylvania Issue
Once these two factors are met, the amount of the subcontrac-
tor's recovery will be based on the value of the benefit that the
owner/lender retains and not simply the value of the invoices sub-
mitted by the subcontractor." For example, in order to recover an
amount of, lets say, $ 50,000 for labor and materials, the subcon-
tractor will have to show that the owner/lender has benefited from
the subcontractor's services to the sum of at least $ 50,000.
II. RECOVERY BASED ON A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
When the subcontractor cannot maintain an action under a un-
just enrichment theory, the subcontractor might possibly obtain
restitution based on a theory that the owner/lender retaining funds
is holding the funds as a constructive trustee for the unpaid sub-
contractor. "[A] constructive trust . . . is not really a trust at all
but rather an equitable remedy. ' '4 7 "[It] is the formula through
which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property
has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of legal
title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, eq-
uity converts him into a trustee.""
If a constructive trust is sought to be imposed on property with-
held for another, there must be some property that has been set
aside for another's account by the one sought to be charged as a
constructive trustee ." Accordingly, in Gee v Eberle"° the court sug-
gested that, if a fund were not in existence to pay the subcontrac-
tors at the time they performed the work, it would be difficult to
find a res on which to base a constructive trust."' However, if there
46. Meehan v Cheltenham Township, 410 Pa 446, 189 A2d 593 (1963); D.A. Hill Co. v
Clevetrust Realty, 524 Pa 425, 573 A2d 1005 (1990).
47. Buchanan v Brentwood Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 457 Pa 135, 151, 320 A2d
117, 126 (1974). See also, Kimball v Barr Township, 249 Pa Super 420, 378 A2d 366 (1977).
48. Buchanan, 320 A2d at 127 (quoting Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225
NY 380, 386, 122 NE 378, 380-81 (1919)).
49. See for example, Philadelphia v Mancini, 431 Pa 355, 360, 246 A2d 320, 322
(1968). See also, In Re Penn Central Transportation Co., 323 F Supp 77 (E D Pa 1971) (an
identifiable res is an essential requisite under a constructive trust theory).
50. 279 Pa Super 101, 420 A2d 1050 (1980).
51. Gee, 420 A2d at 1061, n.9. In Gee the lender (who later bought and became the
owner of the property at a sheriff's sale) had set up a $ 1,350,000 account to fund the pro-
ject. Id. The court noted that there were three possible outcomes upon remand and review
of the record. First, the lower court could find that the original account still had sufficient
funds remaining in the trust to pay the subcontractors. Should this be the case, there would
be a res available consisting of the unexpended funds. The second possibility was that the
original account initially had sufficient funds to pay the subcontractors, however it ran out
of funds at the time of payment. Under these circumstances the court determined there
would still be a res, because the owner/lender had held the fund at a point in time at which
668 Vol. 29:661
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were a fund being withheld from a general contractor until assur-
ances were given that all subcontractors had been paid, then a suf-
ficient res would exist from which the subcontractors could seek
restitution directly under a theory that the fund was held in con-
structive trust.
02
Although the term "constructive trust" did not appear in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Williard, Inc. v
Powertherm Corp.,53 one commentator has suggested that the
court used the constructive trust theory as a vehicle to reach un-
disbursed project funds retained by an owner for the benefit of
subcontractors.5 4 In Williard, the owner retained the remaining
balance of the project fund 55 because the general contractor had
failed to deliver satisfactory evidence that all subcontractors had
been paid pursuant to the terms of the contract.58 The contract
also provided that the owner could pay the unpaid subcontractors
directly, and that the owner could terminate the contract upon
failure of the general contractor to pay the subcontractors.5
The appellees, a judgment creditor of the general contractor and
an assignee of the general contractor's interest in the retainage,
claimed priority over the subcontractors for the retained fund.
Notwithstanding these collateral claims, the court held that, since
the general contractor materially breached the contract by failing
to provide the required assurances that the subcontractors had
been paid, the appellees had no right to the fund s.5 The court then
went on to state:
It would be manifestly unjust for an owner to withhold final payment from
the contractor out of concern for the subcontractors' interests by failing to
distribute the retainage. In such a case there can be no doubt that equity
the fund could be declared the subject of a constructive trust. Id (citing Kimball v Barr, 249
Pa Super 420, 378 A2d 366 (1977)). The third circumstance that could exist would be if "the
original account was no longer in existence-at the time the [subcontractors] performed their
work and any further disbursements made on the project afterwards were in a separate
account .... [This] final possibility would present the greatest obstacle to finding a res."
Gee, 420 A2d at 1061, n.9.
52. See All State Industries, Inc. v H.E. Stoudt & Sons, Inc., 9 D & C 3d 552 (Com-
mon Pleas 1978)(constructive trust in favor of unpaid subcontractors imposed on funds
withheld by the lender when the general contractor failed to develope a release of liens as
required by contract).
53. 497 Pa 628, 444 A2d 93 (1982).
54. See Stanley B. Edelstein, Esq., Beyond Liens and Bond Claims - Some Non-Stat-
utory Remedies for Non-Payment to Subcontractors, 8 CLR 174, 177-78 (1987).
55. There remained a balance due in the fund of $ 147,396. Williard, 444 A2d at 95.
56. Id.
57. Id at 97.
58. Id.
1991
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and justice would recognize the subcontractors' claims against the contract
balance.5 9
Accordingly, when the owner or lender shows the type of "concern for the
subcontractors"6 that was present in Williard and there remains a res of an
undisbursed project fund, subcontractors may recover directly from the
fund on an equitable theory akin to the constructive trust.
III. RECOVERY AS THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
When subcontractors have not been paid for their work because
construction funds have been withheld, they may be entitled to the
funds under the theory that they are third party beneficiaries. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Guy v Liederbach,a' adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 30262 as a guide for ascertain-
ing third party beneficiaries, concluding that:
There is thus a two part test for determining whether one is an intended
third party beneficiary: (1) the recognition of the beneficiary's right must be
"appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties," and (2) the per-
formance must "satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary" or "the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. '"63
59. Id at 97-8.
60. In Williard the "concern for the subcontractors" was evidenced by such things as
reserving the right to: (1) withhold payment from the contractor until satisfactory evidence
is provided that subcontractors have been paid, (2) pay unpaid subcontractors directly, and
(3) terminate the contract upon failure of the general contractor to pay the subcontractors.
Williard, 444 A2d at 97.
61. 501 Pa 47, 459 A2d 744 (1983).
62. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979) states:
§ 302 Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in
the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and
either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to
pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) The circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the benefi-
ciary the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
63. 501 Pa 47, 459 A2d 744 (1983) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302
(1979)). At the time of this writing only one reported case has been found that applies the
Restatement guidelines-in determining whether the subcontractors were third party benefi-
ciaries. See Myers Plumbing & Heating v West End Federal Savings and Ass'n, 345 Pa
Super 559, 498 A2d 966 (1984), and notes 84 to 86 and accompanying text. Prior to the
adoption of the Restatement, courts facing a third party beneficiary claim by subcontractors
used the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Spires v Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa
52, 70 A2d 828 (1950), as a guideline. See In the Matter of Gebco Investment Corp., 641
F2d 143 (3d Cir 1981) and notes 67 to 73 and accompanying text; B. Bornstein & Son. Inc. v
R. H. Macy & Co., 278 Pa Super 156, 420 A2d 477 (1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom,
A third party beneficiary claim will probably succeed when the
provisions of a contract between the owner/lender and the general
contractor expressly give a subcontractor a direct interest as a
third party beneficiary and when funds have been withheld for the
purpose of paying the subcontractor.6
A more challenging situation is presented to subcontractors
when the owner/lender does not expressly obligate itself to pay the
subcontractor(s)., 5 In those situations, a court must determine
whether the contracting parties intended to benefit the subcontrac-
tor(s) as a third party based on the terms of the contract and ac-
tions of the parties.66
Despite the fact that the construction agreement did not obli-
gate the lender to pay subcontractors, the court in In the Matter
of Gebco Investment Corp.,7 found that the subcontractors, as
third party beneficiaries, had a right superior to the owner's bank-
ruptcy trustee's in undisbursed construction loan funds. 8 In Gebco
the loan agreement between the lender and owner provided for the
advancement of monies in stages as the building progressed with
"[a]ll monies borrowed or advanced . . . [to] be applied entirely
and exclusively for the payment of labor and materials used in the
construction. ."69 Furthermore, the final installment of the loan
was not to be made until the owner produced a release of liens
"evidencing payment for all labor done and materials delivered
.. '170 The owner's general manager testified that undisbursed
loan funds were earmarked for the payment of the subcontrac-
Willard, Inc. v Powertherm Corp., 497 Pa 628, 444 A2d 93 (1982) and notes 74 to 80 and
accompanying text; Gee v Eberle, 279 Pa Super 101, 420 A2d 1050 (1980) and note 90.
64. See Kreimer v Second Federal Savings and Loan Association, 196 Pa Super 644,
176 A2d 132 (1961) (despite the fact that materialmen had a no lien contract, they were
third party beneficiaries and entitled to recover from a fund held by lender, when the con-
struction loan agreement contained the provision that "funds or security in [the lender's]
possession . . . shall be held by the [lender] directly to those furnishing labor.
Kreimer, 176 A2d at 132.
65. See Demharter v First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 412 Pa 142, 194 A2d
214 (1963) (bank having no obligation under loan agreement to pay materialmen, was not
liable to materialmen when bank continued to advance funds to the owner after being noti-
fied by the materialmen that they were owed substantial amounts by the owner).
66. B. Bornstein & Son, Inc. v R.H. Macy & Co., 278 Pa Super 156, 420 A.2d 477
(1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Willard, Inc. v Powertherm Corp., 497 Pa 628, 444
A2d 93 (1982) (quoting, Silverman v Food Fair Stores; 407 Pa 507, 509, 180 A2d 894, 895
(1957)).
67. 641 F2d 143 (3d Cir 1981).
68. Gebco, 641 F2d at 143.




tors.71 The bank was also given the option of advancing sums di-
rectly to the subcontractors. 72 The Gebco court concluded that the
contract language and testimony evidenced an intent by the lender
and owner that the withheld funds would be for the benefit of the
subcontractors; based on that evidence, the subcontractors could
recover on a third party beneficiary theory.73
The subcontractors were not so successful in B. Bornstein &
Son, Inc. v R.H. Macy & Co.,7 4 where the court held that they were
not entitled to withheld funds on the theory that they were third
party beneficiaries.7 5 In Bornstein, the court first noted that the
contract between the owner and general contractor contained no
direct actionable promise which could be enforced by the subcon-
tractors; in fact a clause in the contract denied any obligation on
the part of the owner to pay, or see to the payment of, sums owed
to the subcontractors.
7e
The court then looked to the terms of the contract to determine
if there was an intent to make the subcontractors third party bene-
ficiaries. The contract between the owner and general contractor
provided for the following: subcontractors were not to file liens; the
owner could withhold payment to the general contractor if any
liens were filed, but was not required to do so; and if the general
contractor failed to pay subcontractors, the owner could terminate
the general contractor's status." The court determined that these
provisions did not express an intent by the parties to benefit sub-
contractors, but rather an intent by the corporate owner to protect
itself."8 At best, the status of the subcontractors was that of "inci-
dental beneficiaries. '79 As a result of the court's analysis, the sub-
contractors were precluded from recovering withheld funds based
71. Id at 147.
72. Id.
73. Id. The subcontractors were also entitled to recovery on an equitable assignn~ent
theory (see notes 91 to 93 and accompanying text), and an unjust enrichment theory (see
notes 22 to 31 and accompanying text).
74. 278 Pa Super 156, 420 A2d 477 (1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Willard,
Inc. v Powertherm Corp., 497 Pa 628, 444 A2d 93 (1982).
75. Bornstein, 420 A2d at 477.
76. Id at 482.
77. Id.
78. Id at 483.
79. Id. As an incidental beneficiary, the subcontractor would acquire no rights against
the owner or lender. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 315 (1979); Meyers Plumbing
& Heating v West End Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., 345 Pa Super 559, 564-65, 498
A2d 966, 969 (1985).
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on a third party beneficiary theory.0
As noted above,81 the Gebco and Bornstein cases were decided
before the Restatement § 302 two part test was adopted in Guy.
82.
Has the adoption of the two part Restatement test changed the
position of subcontractors claiming restitution against owners or
lenders on a third party beneficlary theory? The answer may be
"yes" based on the decision of Meyers Plumbing & Heating v
West End Federal,83 wherein the court considered the question of
subcontractors' rights under the Restatement.
In Meyers Plumbing & Heating,8 ' the subcontractor attempted
to hold the owners liable for unpaid materials - asserting that it
was a third party beneficiary to either the contract between the
owners and the lender, or the contract between the owners and the
general contractor. The subcontractors based their status on the
fact that the owners occasionally required their own endorsements
on the construction loan checks, in addition to the endorsements of
the subcontractor and general contractor."8 The court applied the
two-part Restatement test and affirmed the lower court's summary
judgment in favor of the owners, stating:
Applying [the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302] principles to the
case at bar, we find that [the subcontractor] is not a third party beneficiary
of either contract. Existence of the no-lien provision in the Contractor War-
ranty and of the Non-Lien Agreement itself manifests an obvious intent by
the owners to protect themselves from the claims of any of [the general
contractor's] subcontractors and to make the subcontractors the sole re-
80. Bornstein, 420 A2d at 483. See also, R.P. Russo Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v
C.J. Pettinato Realty & Development Inc., 334 Pa Super 72, 482 A2d 1086 (1984) (There
was no intent to make the subcontractors third party beneficiaries when they were aware
that the general contractor had authority request that the lender withhold progress pay-
ments to the subcontractors if the general contractor believed that the subcontractors had
breached portions of their contract). Russo, 482 A2d at 1086.
81. See note 63 and accompanying text.
82. See notes 61 to 63 and accompanying text. The court in Gebco based its decision
on the guidelines set forth in Spires v Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 364 Pa 52, 70 A2d 828
(1950), which stated, "To be a third party beneficiary entitled to recover on a contract it is
not enough that it be intended by one of the parties to the contract and the third person
that the latter should be.a beneficiary, but both parties to the contract must so intend and
must indicate that intention in the contract; in other words, a promisor cannot be held
liable to an alleged beneficiary of a contract unless the latter was within his contemplation
at the time the contract was entered into and such liability was intentionally assumed by
him in his undertaking; the obligation to the third party must be created, and must affirma-
tively appear in the contract itself...."
Spires, 70 A2d at 830-31 (footnote and citations omitted).
83. 345 Pa Super 559, 498 A2d 966 (1984).
84. Meyers, 498 A2d at 966.
85. Id at 968.
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sponsibility of [the general contractor]. 86
Since the court in Meyers Plumbing & Heating could only sus-
tain the lower court's summary judgment if the owners were enti-
tled to a judgment as a matter of law,s7 a broad reading of the
decision would seem to indicate that the existence of a no-lien pro-
vision in the contract between the owner and the general contrac-
tor would preclude subcontractors from asserting a third party
beneficiary claim against the owner. If such a broad reading was
extended to agreements between a lender and an owner, the
Gebco8s decision may be questionable, since the owner therein
agreed that no liens would be filed by any of the subcontractors as
one of the conditions of the loan. 9
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that there may be language in
the agreement which may be interpreted as expressing an intent to
benefit the subcontractors, a provision in an agreement that ex-
pressly disclaims any intent to benefit third parties will be given
effect to prevent subcontractors from advancing a claim as third
party beneficiaries. 90
86. Id at 969. The Non-Lien agreement was entered into between the owners and the
general contractor and "stipulated that no claim for work or materials would be made
against the owners except as provided in their building construction contract." Id at 967.
The Contractor Warranty provided that the general contractor "would protect, defend and
indemnify the owners from any claims for unpaid work, labor, or materials and that final
payment would not be made until he delivered to the owners a complete release of all liens
arising out of [his] performance." Id.
87. See 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1035(b)(Purdon 1987).
88.. See notes 67 to 73 and accompanying text.
89. Gebco, 641 F2d at 143, 144.
90. See Gee v Eberle, 279 Pa Super 101, n.7, 420 A2d 1050, n.7 (1980). In Gee provi-
sions in the loan agreement stated that the borrower would "keep the Premises and Im-
provements free of liens or claims for liens for material supplied and for labor or services
performed . . . [and] will hold the right to receive [advances] as a trust fund for the purpose
of paying the costs of construction .... " Gee, 420 A2d at 1050. The court stated that these
provisions might be read as intending to confer a benefit on the subcontractors; however,
against these piovisions, the agreement provided that "[a]ll conditions of the obligations of
Lender to make advances hereunder are imposed solely and exclusively for the benefit of
Lender; . . . [t]he parties do not intend the benefits of this Agreement to inure to any third
party." Id. The court held tlat by these last two provisions the owner and lender did not
intend that the subcontractors should be third party beneficiaries. See also, R. M. Shoe-
maker v Southeastern Pa. Economic Development Corp., 275 Pa Super 504, 410 A2d 60
(1980) (general contractor could not maintain third party beneficiary status when agreement
between owner and bank specifically provided that there would be no third party
beneficiaries).
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IV. RECOVERY BASON ON EQUITABLE OBLIGATIONS OWED TO THE
SUBCONTRACTOR
If a subcontractor cannot recover under a third party beneficiary
theory because both parties to the contract did not intend to bene-
fit the subcontractor, then, under some limited circumstances, the
subcontractor may be able to recover payment under the theory
that the owner or lender owed him an equitable obligation under
the terms of the agreement.
In In re Matter of Gebco Investment Corp.,e' the subcontractor
argued it was entitled to funds withheld by the lender as against
the owner's bankruptcy trustee. The subcontractor based its argu-
ment on the theory that the owner assumed an implied obligation
to the subcontractor. This implication arose out of two require-
ments in the construction loan agreement. First, the owner had to
secure a no-lien stipulation from the general contractor. Second,
the owner had to produce a release .of liens before final payment
was made.92 The court concluded that this arrangement consti:
tuted an equitable obligation by the owner:
By undertaking to provide a release of liens, [the owner] assumed an im-
plied obligation to the subcontractors. The provision was written at the in-
sistence of the [lender] for its benefit, and as a practical matter, it is un-
likely that the loan would have been granted without that condition. Thus
in return for assuming this obligation, [the owner] received substantial con-
sideration in the form of a loan. The trustee, standing in [the owner's]
shoes, is in no position to repudiate the equitable obligation undertaken at
the time the loan was negotiated. The fact that the mortgage was later paid
does not release the equitable charge attached to the funds in the bank's
hands. That fund was encumbered in favor of the subcontractor who had a
superior right to it over the owner or its trustee.
9
3
The decision in Gebco is notable, since almost one year earlier
the court in Bornsteine" rejected the equitable obligation argument
in the context of an owner/general contractor agreement,9 , stating:
91 641 F2d 143 (3d Cir 1981).
92. Gebco, 641 F2d at 143. The subcontractor also successfully argued recovery based
on an unjust enrichment (See notes 22 to 31 and accompanying text) and third party benefi-
ciary theory (See notes 67 to 73 and accompanying text).
93. Gebco, 641 F2d at 148. See also, Warrington v Mengel, 41 Pa Super 362 (1909)
(similar loan arrangement to that in Gebco held to be an equitable assignment).
94. 278 Pa Super 156, 420 A2d 477 (1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nor, Willard,
Inc. v Powertherm Corp., 497 Pa 628, 444 A2d 93 (1982).
95. Except for the fact that the agreement in Bornstein was between the owner and
general contractor, rather than the lender and owner as in Gebco, the agreements had sub-
stantially similar provisions. These provisions provided that certain project funds would be
withheld until a release of liens was supplied which would evidence that the subcontractors
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If we were to accept [the subcontractor's] contention [that the owner should
be liable under an equitable obligation theory] the effect would be to re-
write the owner's contract with the general contractor, thereby disabling the
owner from protecting itself against 'harassing litigation by wronged sub-
contractors and materialmen.' We see no reason to put subcontractors in a
position more advantageous than an owner's position."
Although the Gebco and Bornstein courts reached different re-
sults, the two cases are distinguishable. Gebco involved an agree-
ment between the lender and the owner, which agreement required
the owner to get a release of liens in return for which the owner
would receive the benefit of a loan. The court perceived the owner
as assuming an obligation that the subcontractors would be paid
and, therefore, the retained funds were being withheld for the ben-
efit of the unpaid subcontractors. However, the owner in Bornstein
was not required by any third party to put the release of liens
clause in the agreement in order to receive some benefit; rather,
the owner put the clause in the agreement for its own protection.
The subcontractors were at best "incidental beneficiaries 9 7 and
the owner assumed no obligation to see that the subcontractors
were paid.
In light of the decisions in Bornstein and Gebco, recovery on an
equitable obligation theory has thus far been limited to owner lia-
bility to subcontractors. Applicability of this theory appears to be
limited to situations similar to those in Gebco.
V. RECOVERY BASED ON A RELIANCE THEORY
In Gee v Eberle"s the court discussed the possibility of a subcon-
tractor's recovery based on an equitable lien being imposed on
unexpended loan funds. Such recovery would derive from the sub-
contractor's reliance on promises the owner gave it that there was
adequate financing for the project.9 When the subcontractors in
Gee were not paid for their work, they atteiipted to hold the
had been paid, even though both agreements had "no lien provisions".
96. Bornstein, 420 A2d at 486 (citations omitted). The court went on to state that
subcontractors could adequately protect themselves by requiring the general contractor to
post a surety bond, or make sure that the contract between the owner and general contrac-
tor ". . . includes either an actionable promise on which they can rely, .... or a promise for
their benefit .. " Id.
97. See notes 79 and accompanying text.
98. 276 Pa Super 101, 420 A2d 1050 (1980). See notes 12 to 21 accompanying text.
99. Gee, 420 A2d at 1050. The subcontractors also argued restitution based on an un-
just enrichment theory (see notes 12 to 21 and accompanying text), a constructive trust




lender liable for supplying the original loan obligation based upon
their reliance on the owner's promise that adequate funds where
available.100 The court denied the subcontractor's recovery stating,
". to accept [their] argument would mean that parties to a loan
would lose their freedom to alter its terms. Furthermore, to give
effect to third party reliance on the existence of a loan fund might
have unfortunate consequences for the construction industry."101
However, one of the subcontractors was allowed recovery based on
a reliance theory, because he had received assurances directly from
the lender (rather than the owner) that adequate funds were being
withheld to pay him for work done."0 2
VI. RECOVERY BASON ON AGENCY PRINCIPLES
In Meyers Plumbing & Heating v West End Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 0° the court entertained a subcontractor's attempt to
hold the owner liable based on agency principles."" In Meyers
Plumbing & Heating the lenders, to satisfy any misgivings of the
subcontractor, sent a letter to the subcontractor stating that the
lender would not make disbursements of funds "until the work was
completed and [the lender] had in its possession a satisfactory in-
spection report."10 5 The owner eventually had the lender stop con-
struction payments due to a dispute between the owner and the
general contractor.'06 The subcontractor was left unpaid for mater-
ials ordered by, and sold to, the general contractor. 07
The subcontractor sought recovery based on agency principles,
asserting that the letter sent to him constituted a contract by the
100. Gee, 420 A2d at 1050. The original loan obligation was for $1,3500,00, but was
later reduced to $1,100,000 due to the facts that one of the tenants had pulled out and not
as much space was needed. Id at 1053.
101. Id at 1063. The court stated that the lender would be subjected to "unbargained
for risk" if an unethical owner misrepresented to the subcontractors the extent of the
lender's financing. Id. To avoid liability in such a case, the lender would have to disclose to
each subcontractor at the outset of the project the actual funds available, and advise the
subcontractors of any changes in the agreement during construction. "This obligation might
discourage a lender from engaging in a project." Id.
102. Id at 1054, 1064.
103. 345 Pa Super 559, 498 A2d 966 (1985). The subcontractors also attempted to as-
sert claims against the owner under an unjust enrichment theory (see note 11) and as a
third party beneficiary (see notes 83 to 86 and accompanying text).
104. Meyer, 498 A2d at 966.





lender who was acting in its capacity as an agent of the owner. 08
For summary judgment purposes, the court assumed that an
agency relationship -existed between the lender and owner, and
that the letter was indeed a contract between the lender, acting as
agent for the owner, and the subcontractor. 09 However, since the
record revealed no evidence that disbursements had been made
before the work was completed or that the lender had in its posses-
sion a satisfactory inspection report, the terms of the contract were
not breached."10
VII. RECOVERY BASED ON TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
If an owner or lender interferes with the general contractor's
contractual obligations to the subcontractor, a subcontractor may
recover damages against an owner or lender for tortious interfer-
ence if:
1) the acts complained of were willful and intentional; 2) that they were
calculated to cause damage to the [subcontractor] in his business; 3) that
these were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss to
the [subcontractor] without right or justifiable cause on the part of the de-
fendant; and 4) that actual damage and loss resulted."'
In R.P. Russo Contractors &'Engineers, Inc. v C.J. Pettinato
Realty & Development Inc.,"' the subcontractor was appealing the
lower court's order dismissing its claim against the lender, which
claim alleged tortious interference with the contractual relation-
ship between the subcontractor and the developer of the project." 3
The reviewing court agreed with the lower court: when a lender is
legally bound to disburse construction funds to the general con-
tractor, a subcontractor will have no claim based on tortious inter-
ference against the lender simply for making payments to the gen-
eral contractor, without regard to problems occurring between the
general contractor and subcontractor." 4 However, since the sub-
108. Id at 968.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. R.P. Russo Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v C.J. Pettinato Realty & Develop-
ment Inc., 334 Pa Super 72, 77, 482 A2d 1086, 1090 (1984) (citing Glenn v Point Park
College, 441 Pa 474, 272 A2d 895 (1971)). The decision in R.P. Russo was limited to a sub-
contractor claim against the lender.'However, a tortious interference cause of action should
also exist against an owner if these four elements are satisfied.
112. Russo, 482 A2d at 1090.
113. Id at 1091.
114. Id. The subcontract provided that the subcontractor was to receive $224,295.00.
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contractor's complaint had alleged that the lender conspired with
the general contractor to oust the subcontractor for unlawful pur-
poses, a cause of action for tortious interference was stated and the
case remanded for a determination on the tortious interference
claims." 5
CONCLUSION
When a subcontractor is unable to recover from the general con-
tractor for labor and material, subcontractors have argued a num-
ber of theories to hold owners or lenders liable to the subcontrac-
tor, despite the lack of privity between themselves and the owners
or lenders. First, subcontractors have recovered under a theory of
unjust enrichment. Under this theory, a subcontractor must first
show that the owner/lender has been enriched by retaining a bene-
fit from the labor and/or material that the subcontractor fur-
nished. Once the subcontractor has shown that the owner has been.
enriched, the subcontractor must next show that it would be ineq-
uitable for the owner/lender to retain the benefit without compen-
sating the subcontractor for the benefit conferred. Correspond-
ingly, subcontractors have been successful in cases where the
owner/lender has retained the benefit of the subcontractor's labor
and/or materials, while withholding funds out of which the subcon-
tractors were to be paid. However, the recent Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court decision in D.A. Hill Co. "6 suggests that, even in
these circumstances, there is no unjust enrichment if the owner/
lender has not misled the general contractor or subcontractor and
Id at 1088. Payments were to be received as the work progressed. The subcontractor was to
submit requests for payments to the developer, who would incorporate the subcontractors
requests with their request for payment to the lender. The contract did not provide that the
lender was to compensate the subcontractor, but, in fact, specifically provided that the
lender would only disburse the funds to the prime contractor and not subcontractors. Id at
1090. The problem occurred when the developer declined one of the subcontractor's re-
quests and advised the subcontractor that no payment on the remaining money due on the
subcontract would be made. Id at 1088.
115. Id at 1091. The court also permitted the subcontractor to amend its complaint to
assert that the lender and the developer conspired to oust appellant, in order to reduce the
cost of constructing the project. However, the subcontractor's request to amend its com-
plaint to assert a third party beneficiary cause of action was denied. Id at 1092. The court
distinguished Gebco (see notes 67 to 73 and accompanying text) because, in the present
case, no funds were being held strictly for the payment of subconiractors. Moreover, the
agreement between the developer and the subcontractor stated that the developer had full
authority not to request progress payments for the subcontractors, if it believed the subcon-
tract had been breached. Russo, 482 A2d at 1092.
116. See notes 32 to 40 and accompanying text.
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if the subcontractors have entered into the contract with the gen-
eral contractor without securing a performance bond or mechanic's
lien.
The second argument that has been successful for subcontrac-
tors is based on a constructive trust theory. Subcontractors have
recovered under this theory when they have identified a res of
funds in existence at the time of their performance, which fund
had been set aside for their benefit by the owner or lender. In
these cases, the owner or lender has been held to be a constructive
trustee of the funds and found liable to the subcontractor for the
funds.
A third theory available to subcontractors is the status of third
party beneficiaries to a contract between the owner or lender and
the general contractor. This status arises when there are provisions
in the contract that indicate an intention by the parties to benefit
the subcontractors. Subcontractors have successfully argued that
the owner (or lender) and the general contractor intended to make
them third party beneficiaries of construction funds when the con-
tract language between the parties demonstrated an intent by the
parties that the funds were withheld for the benefit of the subcon-
tractors. Owners or lenders can easily protect themselves from
third party beneficiary claims by expressly disclaiming any intent
to benefit the subcontractors in the contract with the general con-
tractor. In addition, the existence of a no-lien provision in the con-
tract between an owner and the general contractor has been held
to preclude subcontractors from asserting a third party beneficiary
claim against the owner.
On a fourth theory, subcontractors may also recover when the
owner has assumed an equitable obligation, namely obligating it-
self to see that the subcontractors get paid. This implied obligation
may occur when the owner has conceded to the lender's demands
to secure a release of liens and a no-lien stipulation from the gen-
eral contractor in return for a loan.
Finally, subcontractors may be entitled to recovery from an
owner or lender under reliance, agency, and tortious interference
theories. Claims under these theories have not been as successful
as those mentioned above.
Obviously, the best chance of recovery for an unpaid subcontrac-
tor is first to proceed against the general contractor. If the subcon-
tractor cannot recover from the general contractor, then the above
mentioned theories may provide relief by holding the owner or
lender liable to the unpaid subcontractor.
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To protect themselves from claims by unpaid subcontractors,
owners and lenders may require the general contractor to post a
bond that expressly guarantees payment of a subcontractor, in
which case the subcontractor can recover against the surety as a
third-party beneficiary of the bond. In addition, the lender and
owner should make unequivocally clear in their contracts that they
have no intention of making subcontractors third party benefi-
ciaries to the contract.
Jeffrey Murray

